Russian narratives in Montenegro target the Ecumenical Patriarch during Nicaea events
Hello there. This is the third in a series of in-depth analyses I’m writing in partnership with the Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub dealing with the November Nicaea commemoration at Iznik (Turkey).
The gathering might have been the highlight of Catholic-Orthodox relations in 2025, but in the Balkans, Russia has been stoking fears of “unia”, undermining Bartholomew's and Pope Leo's ecumenism.
Super glad that the analysis was picked up and republished in Ukraine and Bulgaria.
One of the vectors of Kremlin propaganda in the Western Balkans concerns labelling any ecumenical engagement as a revival of so-called “uniatism”, a concept implying attempts to bring Orthodoxy into communion with the Vatican. Moscow considers such engagement as a way for the Vatican to expand Catholic influence, a narrative used to present Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church as being the main defender of Orthodox Christianity.
Written by: Dr Andreja Bogdanovski, Analyst
The analysis was first published by Truthmeter and Antidisinfo.
It was never a question of if, but of how quickly the joint commemoration of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 325 AD, and which took place only a few weeks ago, would be attacked for its ecumenical symbolism among the Slavic Orthodox. Critical voices close to Belgrade and Moscow have already begun attacking the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for promoting “papist” tendencies at Iznik.
In Montenegro, where the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has long held a strong position, pro-Russian and pro-Serbian outlets have, over the years, systematically used symbolic gestures of ecumenical rapprochement between Rome and the Phanar to cast suspicion on the Ecumenical Patriarch. The momentum created by the Nicaea anniversary celebrations thus became a prime target for importing Russia-friendly narratives aimed at sustaining disunity among the Orthodox.
The current episode fits into a larger narrative in which Moscow is depicted as the stronghold and protector of traditional Orthodoxy, while the Ecumenical Patriarch is portrayed as someone prepared to exert papal-like power and to compromise the Orthodox church.
Belgrade’s political and church influence over religious affairs in Montenegro, which has been especially strengthened after the signing of the “Fundamental Agreement” between the Montenegrin government and the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2022, has also solidified the Montenegrin informational ecosystem, allowing unchecked Serbian and Russian church vectors of influence.
Recently, Russian hybrid operations in the Balkans, including Moldova, have become more aggressive, according to a recent report by Montenegro’s Digital Forensic Centre (DFC). In Moldova, Russian intelligence activities followed the same pattern as in Montenegro in 2016 — relying on the church element and using Serbia in both cases as “the central hub for GRU’s para-intelligence activities.”
According to DFC, the aim of these operations is to “weaken the country’s pro-European orientation, undermine institutional credibility, and create an atmosphere of political instability.”
Similarly to Moldova’s elections this autumn, seen as crucial to its EU future, the report warns of attempts to destabilise Montenegro before the 2027 parliamentary elections as the country stands on the verge of joining the EU.
The DFC also points out a growing prevalence of Russian narratives circulated through disinformation news sources in the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe that are sympathetic to Moscow and designed to resemble trustworthy news platforms; these outlets disseminate disinformation and divisive messages, which are amplified via social media.
Ljubomir Filipović, a Montenegrin political scientist focusing on foreign influence and information integrity, told Antidisinfo.net that Russian church propaganda in Montenegro is disseminated through various social-media channels, including Telegram groups such as Rat Uživo and BuntCG, as well as traditional media outlets like the news portals Borba, In4s, Adria, and Prva TV.
According to him there are now cases of agents of influence working “inside the public broadcaster — both national and local,” adding that increasingly “local authorities are openly shifting toward pro-Russia messaging, making dissemination easier and more coordinated.”
In recent months, Montenegrin informational space has been overwhelmed by news surrounding Serbian church efforts to rehabilitate WW2 Chetnik commander Pavle Ðurišić. His illegally placed monument, erected near the town of Berane, was hidden within a Serbian church monastery – a process overseen by the controversial SOC Metropolitan Metodije. This, along with the legalisation efforts of a small church planted in the early 2000s and brought by helicopter onto Rumija mountain, attests to the Serbian Orthodox Church’s ability to influence political processes and media narratives in Montenegro.
The second vector is the Russian one, exercised through Orthodox channels that rely on intra-Orthodox splits and theological arguments. Two Montenegrin media outlets, In4S and Borba, known for their pro-Serbian and pro-Russian leanings, consistently report in an anti-Constantinople tone. They often draw on Russian sources such as Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, boosting their narratives, while also directly cross-posting content.
‘Unia’ fearmongering
One such article, published by In4S and sourced from RT Balkan, asks in its headline whether “unia” between the Catholics and Orthodox has already begun. This type of framing is supposed to play on the feelings of the faithful by suggesting a form of “betrayal” by the Ecumenical Patriarch, who, by participating in the Doxology and Divine Liturgy, with Pope Leo (in attendance), the article argues, has agreed to subjugate Orthodoxy. This represents example of use of the media space to project historical fears.
Questioning how “well intentioned” the long-awaited Nicaea anniversary was, the piece highlights the absence of the Russian Orthodox Church, a situation it attributes to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s recognition of the Ukrainian church’s autocephaly in 2019.
The article relies almost entirely on comments from a law faculty professor Zoran Čvorović, who claims that the joint ecumenical prayer on the shores of Lake Iznik last month was “not just a regular prayer” but “an ideal occasion of the Pope to pursue ‘unia’,” – the idea of bringing Orthodoxy into communion with Rome. He further claims that the current disunity among the Orthodox is certainly well known in the Vatican and likely considered an opportunity to extent Catholic influence. No other experts have been quoted in the text.
Dialogue at Nicaea – between rapprochement and reassurance
Concerns over the ‘unia’ theory, though not new, have gained more prominence this year, fuelled by discussions about agreeing on a common Easter date under the previous Pope (Francis) as part of the Nicaea momentum.
According to Tetiana Derkatch, a Ukrainian religious analyst, the possibility of “unia” has deep historical significance for Russia and remains a “sore point” for the Russian church, which considers the conversion to the unias and Catholicism “a betrayal of Christian faith.”
“The Russian Church sees Uniatism as an aggressive proselytising campaign by Rome among traditionally Orthodox peoples,” she told Antidisinfo.net.
Although, as Christians, any type of division is harmful to the celebration of Christ, both religious leaders have refuted calls for immediate reunification between Catholics and Orthodox, rejecting any form of subjugation.
After visiting Nicaea, Pope Leo stated that the goal is “a communion which does not imply absorption or domination, but rather an exchange of the gifts received by our churches from the Holy Spirit for the glory of God the Father and the edification of the body of Christ.”
Speaking earlier on the issue of reaching agreement on a common Easter date, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew stated that it would be done only through a conciliar decision, i.e. by holding a pan-Orthodox council. Last year, he reassured the Orthodox leaders that any potential decision on agreeing on a common Easter date would not mean unification with the Catholic church.
“This agreement pertains solely to the date of Easter’s celebration and does not imply joint liturgical practices with our Roman Catholic brethren, which would require ecclesial communion between our Churches—a state we have not yet achieved despite theological dialogue progress and significant steps made,” Bartholomew clarified in December 2024.
From Ukraine to the Balkans
Amid the growing ecumenical attention surrounding the Nicaea commemorations, the Montenegrin portal In4s last year republished another article warning of the supposedly looming “unia” and its alleged consequences for Serbia and Montenegro.
The article (taken from Sputnik Serbia) highlighted a speech by UOC Metropolitan Luka (Kovalenko) of Zaporizhzhia and Melitopol at a Belgrade conference on the role of the Constantinople Patriarchate in Ukraine, organised by the Centre for Russian Studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences.
In Ukraine, Metropolitan Luka is known for his aggressive stance against the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and Patriarch Bartholomew. He was served with a notice of suspicion by Ukraine’s Security Service in 2024, which alleges that he used rhetoric against other parishioners of other denominations during church liturgies, undermining the socio-political situation in the frontline region in favour of the aggressor country.
In his Belgrade address, he labelled the formation of Ukraine’s independent church as a “testing ground” for the unia “experiment,” cautioning that the Nicaea anniversary celebrations this year warrant specific consideration.
The Ukrainian Metropolitan warned that the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s ‘strategy’ began in 2018 with the granting of Ukrainian autocephaly, with the next stage aimed at establishing a union between the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
“If this goal is achieved, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Vatican will use the ‘Ukrainian precedent’ as proof that the reunification of Orthodox and Catholics without changing their doctrinal teachings is both achievable and realistic,” stated the Ukrainian Metropolitan.
Similar to professor Čvorović’s arguments, Metropolitan Luka claimed that the main targets of such processes unleashed by the Ecumenical Patriarch are the Russian Orthodox Church and the churches in the Balkans, “which are the strongest opponents of uniatism and the power ambitions of the Phanar.”
Speaking to AntiDisinfo, Filipović noted that hostility against the Phanar in Montenegro is primarily shaped by Serbian nationalist circles aligned with Moscow, and that among the Serbian Orthodox Church believers, Bartholomew “has never been promoted as a legitimate religious authority.”
“While Greeks are seen positively as fellow Orthodox Christians, Greek clergy including the Ecumenical Patriarch — are often portrayed by Serbian priests and nationalist media as ‘treacherous’ or ‘cunning’,” he stated.
Russian line of attack
Metropolitan Luka’s insights reflect a familiar rhetorical pattern within the Russian Orthodox Church aimed at undermining Rome and Bartholomew’s authority. Apart from Montenegro and Serbia, his conference speech was also shared by the official webpage of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Department for External Church Relations.
An outspoken critic of uniatism was its former head – Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk (now ‘retired’ in the Czech Republic). Within the framework of the work of the theological commissions, he described “unia” as a “bleeding wound on the body of Christendom”.
One year into the invasion of Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill pointed his finger at the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, who he says are a result of “the very idea of Unia” – the subjection of church life to Rome with an apparent preservation of the Eastern rite.”
The Russian Patriarch drew parallels to recent years, where the Ukrainian Greek Catholics have, he said, aligned with “an openly nationalistic agenda in Ukraine” and are responsible for the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Derkatch pointed out to AntiDisinfo that Russia is using the accusations against the Ecumenical Patriarchate to gain support among the Slavic churches and the two ancient patriarchates, Antioch and Jerusalem.
“The thesis is being promoted that Uniatism is a heresy, and Patriarch Bartholomew, who participates in symbolic events with the Pope, has in fact fallen into heresy, and therefore the primacy of Constantinople should be abolished,” she explained.
This article was developed in partnership with the regional initiative Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub, implemented by the Metamorphosis Foundation with financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The contents of the article are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the project partners and donor.
https://antidisinfo.net/